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AUTHENTICATING
LOSS
AND
CONTESTING
RECOVERY
FEMA and the Politics of Colonial
Disaster Management
Sarah Molinari

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA ) has consumed
headline s in Puerto Rico sin ce Hurricane Marfa made landfall. From
che pre st0 rm underscaffing and lack of Spanish-speaking workers co
chc undelivered pallets of water and big contracts for inexperienced
bidders , news of che US disaster agency's problem s grabbed local and
international media attention. Bue the FE.MA central operations
hub had an air of efficiency and organization. The GRF Media build ing in Guaynabo chat hou ses FEMA' s central offices bu stled like a
newsroom on che day I visited co condu ce an interview - rows of
open de sks, phone s ringing, message board s, map s, and hundred s of
staffers. Behind the appearance of smooch operations, h owever, were
layers of failure and incomplete recovery. According to FEMA daca,1
the agency approv ed 464,82 1 applications for rh~ Individu al .and
Household Assistance Program, which covers repair coses co pnmary residen ce personal property and household structural damage in
designated "essentia l living areas.'' 2 Bue chis number fails co account
for chose who were approved but underfunded and for the more than
three hundred thousand applicants who were denied. While man y
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filed appeals, FEMA denied or did not respond co 79 percent of rhc
appeal claims.' I argue chat insncucional failure gave way ro contested recovery frameworks chat challenge rhe assumptions of colonial
disaster management and its disciplining tools.

UNEQUAL
DISASTER
AND
~DTRAS
MARfAS
" INLAS
CAROLINAS
, CAGUAS
In the semiruraJ neighborhood of Las Carolinas, Caguas, where I
am conducting ethnographic research and collaborating with the
neighborhood Centro de Apoyo Mutuo (CAM; Mutual Support
Center), layered abandonment over time and demographic specificities exacerbared the impact of Hurricane Marfa. sixty co sevent)
percent of rhe community's twenty -five hundred residents are over
fifty-fiveyears old, and one in three households lives below the poverty line.• According to the Residents' Association , Las Carolinas has
lost 20 percent of its population since 2013, leaving behind elderly
residents with tenuous family support. In the words of a CAM leader
reflecting on the storm's one-year anniversary , "Before Jiving ch rough
Maria , we experienced otras Al arias. Because for the people with less
resources, we're che ones who are always at chc boccom."
Families left Las Carolinas in large number , especially in 2017
when the Puerto Rico Department of Education shut down the
Maria Montanez Gomez elementary school as pare of chat year's wave
of 167 school closures. Parents, residents, and teachers had struggled
since 2012 co keep Las Carolinas's only elementary school open
through protests, standardized test boycorcs, strikes, and countless
meetings with education and municipal officials. Bue the Department of Education pointed to below-a,·erage scores on standardized
tests and declining enrollment, finally shumng the school down in
spring 2017. Recalling che five-year struggle, one mother cold me:
My dad, aunts and uncles, my kids, and I all studied here . I remember rhe lase sixth-grade graduation here was when my youngest son graduated . .. • I remember we hdd a strike co protest the
school closing, and a friend of mine asked me, "\X'har are }OU doing here?• Ami I ,aid, "W"hy arc you asking me rhh?w "Because
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your son already graduated," she s.tid. And I said. "What doc, char
have co do with anything? M) son graduated, bur he came from
here, and I still have hi~ cousins here. and I'm here for them , and
for your daughter coo, who's still here.

After Maria, Las Carolinas residents went without water service
for three months , w1chour electricity for seven months, and wirhour
scorn, municipal debns pickup for c:ighcy days. During the poseMarfa wait for debris collection, some residents made a monthly
ritual out of acknowledging the debris's "birthday" and decorat ing the piles lining the streets with Christmas ornaments. Truch
from chc privately contracted company EC Waste finally appeared
in early December 2017 after che Residents' Associacio~ pr_e~id~nt,
Miguel Rosario Lozada, wrote an op-ed in El Nruvo Dra crmqumg
the mayor and what he called "the absent municipal scace."5 Among
other things, the municipality kept delaying debris picku~, barely
circulated information, and onginally scheduled Las Carolinas last
·
6
among all the municipality 's neighborhoo ds rror power ~escor~uon.
Even after debris removal, residents organized cleaning bngades
co do basic Yegccarion maintenance like rrec mmming and m~wmg around che public screecs. The hollowing out of these municipal
services certainly contributed co the posrhurricanc blackout and
infrastructure collapse chat was part of a longer process of public
divestment. For example, che municipal icy of Caguas cue back on
maintenance with a 14 percent coral budget cue from 2016 co 2018,
exacerbated by a $350 million cue from co the central go\'ernmenc's
contributions co all municipalities in fiscal year 201- -18-budgccs,
of course, approved and imposed by che colonial Fiscal Conrrol
Board, locally referred co as laJunta. ~
Beyond the uneven effects of austerity and Maria , disaster ass~scance and recovery measures chcmselYeSmay exacerbate vulnerabdit) and inequality over cime.8 These contradictions have also shaped
alternative }\·ays of imagining recovery ch rough tZpo_yo
mutuo (mutual
support ) rather rhan dominant individualizing and markec-dri~en
frameworks meant co restort pnvacc property, wealth, and the existing social order.
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"TOTAL
LOSS
" AND
THE
STRUGGLE
FOR
ADIGNIFIED
HOME

Jennifer, a residenr of Las Carolinas, still lives with a blue tarp covering her roof fifi:een months alter Hurricane Mana. 9 She lives with five
family members in the basement of her house because che top floor
is uninhabitable. She applied for FEMA's Individual and Household
Assistance Program, and FEMA inspectors arrived five weeks afier
Mana ro declare Jennifor's house a "total los~."Jennifer ha\ lived in
her home for forty-four years, bur like many ochers in the community \\ ho live on parcel,ischar have been divided over rime and passed
on through inhemance, she does nor have formal property tirle.1° In
face, a confidenrial FEMA memo from 201 l lim Las Carolinas as
one of I 16 areas in Puerto Rico chat FEMA identifies as a "squatte r
11
communicr." The memo provides impccnon gu1delmes and scares
chat ~quarters, and prcsumabl> the entire communities listed, arc
itul({!,iblefor home repair assistance because "rhc> are nor the owner of rhc damaged dwelling." In November 2018 rhe FL\[A Puerto
Rico News Desk confirmed with me via email correspondence char
the 2011 squatter communities list had not been updated, although
it remains unclear whether this list was used during Hurricane Maria
and how rhe memo might have shaped prejudiced a\sumpriom about
"squarten and identified communities. Legal activist groups like
Ayuda Lcg,ll Huracan Mana pressured 1--EMAco revise its policy on
verifying and assisrmg individual owners ren months after l\faria. 12
Under the revised policy, applicants could submit a" declarative statement" to "prove" ownership wich their FEMA appl-als if che) did noc
have a formal cirlc, but this was coo little too lace. FEMA faded co
systematically circulate information about chis new option to verify
o,,·ner,hip, leaving many who would have qualified out of the loop.
Because of her tenuous ownership status in the eyes of the state,
Jennifer applied for FEMA individual assistance. supported b) an affidavit from a pro bono lawyer staring chat she was the rightful owner
and occupant of rhe homt: and that she was securing her form,tl title. To
Jennitcr's surprise, Puerto Rico's Departamenco de Vivienda (Housing Department) finall)• began procemng her application for a forma l
title alter .Man,\, even though she:had been applying for decades. She

Authenticating Loss and Contesting Recovery

I

289

expressed co me a ,cme of relief because ,he ,tlmo:st had her tide, as if
rhb dowmcnc might reduce her vulnerability co iurure storms.
FE~1A imralled a blue carp un Jennifer's home and authorized
$11,000 co repair structural damage, including a new cemenr roof,
doon, and windows. Jennifer has nor, however, been able to find a
contractor co do rhe job within chis budget because \he estimates
chat $11,000 will cover only materials, wood, and some of the labor. 1'
She appealed che rEMA decision co err co gee a larger amount bur
\\ as denied and could not understand how "coral loss" amounted co
$11,000: ~lhey came and cook photos. !hey s,1w,"she said.
To fill in the :Misrancc: gap, che Dc:parcamenro de Vn 1enda recommended chat Jennifer apply for Tu Hogar Renace (Your Home
Is Revived), a FEMA-fonded program local!) admmiscered through
rhe Deparcmenco de \'1v1enda chat provides up to $20,000 for minor
emergency repairs co make house "safe and functional." Tu Hogar
Rcnace is organized around seven construction conglomerates (five
US companies, cwo Puerto Rican companies) char have divided up
che archipelago into concraccor zones. Note.: char the Tcxas-ba~ed
SLS Company (designated for zone 2) was award~d a $1_45m11l'.on
contract in 2018 for Texas border wall conscrucnon, h1ghl1glmng
the entanglements between the US disaster and security indusmes.
These seven major companies then contract smaller conscrucnon
companies in Puerto Rico co proV1de labor and materials, bur the
major profit, arc funnded co che top. \[y interviews with Tu Hogar
Ren.Ke and fEMA impeccors revealed the exploitative nature of
mspcccion work. Impeccors working for FE~[A's subconcracrors
described working seven days a week "de sol a sol" {from sunup to
sundown ) and driving in difficult conditions in their personal v~hicb, ofi:en without GPS or phone signal, co inspect homes both bctore
and afi:cr disascc.:raid was dmributcd. Inspectors, many of them lowpaid Puerto Rllan workers\\ 1th lircle expenencc _or for'.n_al_
training
in chis field were generall~ paid per inspection, 1ncent1v1zmg them
1
co work like "machincs," as one impccror described. TI1ey act as the
"eyes of FE~[A " and collect evidence on c.lecrronic tabkts using formulas, written comments, mcasureml.!nts, inventories, and photos to
,luthcncicate rhe owner's account ofloss and damage: they then ~end
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che report co FEMA for quality-control reviews for final approval.
Even though final aid determinations arc out of their hands, inspectors described scracegies like caking extra phocos or photographing
structural damage at dramatic angles to help residencs receive the
most aid possible. One of the main casks for workers doing Tu Hogar
Renace final inspections was co ensure rhac the house was "habitable''
and thac all construction materials and appliances were properly
installed and made in che United Scates-if something was identified
as an incernacionally made product, ic failed inspection and needed
co be reinstalled.

a, .......,,.
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nori ficarion. "Time was up," they cold her, and the promised $20,000
vanished. Ironically, Tu Hogar Renace's webpage logo reads, "The
first step to your recuperation" (hccps://tuhogarrenace.com/).
I asked Jennifer if she was going to appeal the Tu Hogar Renace
decision, which she had a right co do, bur she said no because "chey don't
answer che phones. There are always problems with the contact. And
so here I am." After the slow violence of rhe bureaucratic marathon
that seemed to work against her every step of che way, she felt resigned
and overcome with a kind of disaster assistance fatigue. The slow violence of this wait for documents, inspections, follow-up calls, and contractors was not eventful or extraordinary bur rather banal, everyday,
and formative of Jennifer's experience of pose-disaster trauma and the
anxiery of living without a roof.15 Jennifer's experience unsettles the
normative cemporality of disaster that moves linearly from response
to recovery and rebuild ing-without a proper roof, "recovery" seemed
stuck in time for her.

DISCIPLIN
INGDISASTER
SUBJECTS

Tu Hogar Renace contractors. Screenshot of website, November

2018.

Tu Hogar Renace approved Jennifer for the maximum $20,000
for interior repairs like replacing che stove, sinks, refrigerator, cabinets, and beds and for installing electric generacors. 1'' Bur Jennifer
kept delaying the work because it made no sense co install interior
equipment without a proper roof. "I was waiting and waiting, time
was passing, and che roof was becoming more damaged. And every
time [Tu Hogar Renace] wanced to come and install che equipment, I
had to scop them because without a roof everything inside che house
would be damaged," she said. Tu Hogar Renace cold Jennifer to call
once she had che roof done. Then around September 2018, she called
because she had gotten some temporary zinc panels on pare of rhe
roof. so she figured she could scare installing che interior equipment
little by lirde. Bur Tu Hogar Renace had closed her case wichour any

Jennifer's case highlights the disciplining role that properry plays in
dominant inStitutional disaster relief frameworks, or the tensions between FEMA's reliance on formal property title versus people's lived
experience of diverse property relations in Puerto Rico. Discourses
stigmatizing residents without formal property titles came up repeatedly in my interviews with officials from agencies like FEMA and
COR3. 16 The project to "formalize property" is in face central co
official visions of "resiliency," mitigation, and disaster preparedness
in pare because it ensures che smooth operation of che homeowners'
insurance market and future property speculation. The July 2018
draft central government Disaster Recovery Plan proposes $800 million to promote property ride registration and establish penalties for
those who do not register, bur with little detail about how chis will
be executed. Furthermore, Puerto Rico's Deparcamento de Vivienda's amended Action Plan for federal CDBG-DR funds includes a
proposal for a $400 million "Tide Clearance Program" to formalize
tide for properties not located in floodplains or landslide risk areas. 1~
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In lace May 2018, I visired the Caguas Disaster Recuperation
Center to inquire about municipality-specific FEMA data because
I could not find this information

online. There were only about

four residents in a large gymnasium making their rounds through
the information tables. In fact, rhere were more armed guards in the
gymnasium than Caguas residents, although it was unclear whac che
security threat was. The director cold me he could not give out any
information, but he gave me a contact at the FEMA Media Rclac1ons
Department.

From there, f communicated

via email and was veered

for over two months by both Media Relations and the News Desk
to scheduJc an interview with a high -ranking FEMA Coordination
Officer in August 2018. This process of accessing information and
navigating contacts and offices was, of course, enabled by my own
posirionaliry as a whice, English-dominant visiting researcher.

I was given a fifi:een-minuce time sloe wich chis official and
ch ree of hb sea ff members, who sac in the room keeping time and
audio-recording the interview, which I was also audio -recording.
I asked abouc FEM A's perspective on the widespread trouble people were having with their applications and appeals . Referring co
FEMA 's five- to ten-year vision, the official said:
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resilience bonds; 1caim calls for expanding homeowners ' Roodinsurance, incencivizing so-called positive behavior change through training and exercises, and increasing personal financial preparedness,
which is hardly an easy cask for vulnerable, racializcd populations
mosc at risk in these disasters. 18 For institutional agents of relief and
recovery, che ideal "disaster subject" could be: thought of as a private
propcrry-ownmg

individual who has, a formal property title, home

msurance, Rood insurance, savings in the bank, and a ten-day supply
of food and water for each person in chc household. 19
FEMA

Get financially prepared for emergencies.
Consider saving money in an emergency
savings account and be sure to keep a small
amount of cash at home in a safe place since
ATM's and credit cards may not work during
a disaster.
0 8

\Xfe're trying to change the culture of waiting for rhe lase minute .... The people in Puerto Rico need co scare chinking, •1 need
to rake care of mysc:l( I have co be responsible for my own future.
I have co cake action. I can't wait for stuff co be given co me." And
l'm celling you because I'm Puerco Rican-chis is cultural. The\·'re
waiting for scuff co happen. \Xieneed co change chat co be pr~active for our own future. lf you're going co fix your house, don't do
it halfway. Use the besc materials.

I rhought ofJenniter, who had been "taking action" all along , and
all those for whom "recovery" is an ambiguous promise. The FEMA

2018-22 Strategic Plan echoes chis culcuralist argument-promoting a neoliberal "culture of preparedness," as the Coordination

Offi-

cer described. The plan makes no mention of climate change, and
its strateg ic goals include encouraging local jurisdictions co invest
in pred1saster mitigation through new financial instruments called

FEMA tweet on emergency financial preparedness , April 9, 2018.

Personal indebting also figures a) a disciplining

cool of disas-

ter recovery. In August 2018 rcpre,encarives from FE.MA and the
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Nanonal Flood Insurance Program hosred a workshop in Las Carolinas to promote low-interest loans from rhe federal Small Business
Administration; these loans do nor ha\'e rhe same use restrictions as
FEMA assistance and can be used for individual households or sma ll
businesses to fill in rclieffunding gaps. Alier a long PowerPoint presencanon, the FEMA rcpresenranve assured a group of mostly elderly
,urendces that these loans are secure and nondiscriminatory, un like
private bank loans: "\Vhcn we chink about loans, we chink about
Banco Popular, bur this is a loan co helpafi:er a disaster," the representative emphasized. This was met by one frusrrarcd resident insisting
char rhc representative review ocher disaster relief options because
debt 1sa hard thing to sell among low-income, elderly people.

REIMAGINING
RECOVERY
THROUGH
APOVO
MUTUO
Bur there are local alternar1ve projects to reimagine disaster recovery
£'ollect111ely
rarher than through racisr cultural deficiency frameworks
and modes of indcbring. For example, a number of autonomously
organized Centros de Apoyo Mutuo arose in rhe aftermath of Hurricane Maria, including one in Las Carolinas. Herc, Jennifer and
other woman residents occupy tht: closed i\lana Montanez Gomez
clemenrarr school, rransforming chis abandoned space into a one of
healing, care work, and learning char has shifted in response co rhc
community's needs from the emergency co longer-term recover) and
local transformation. Women ar che CAM cook and home-deliver
about one hundred lunches three nmes a week along rwo routes in
the community ro elder!) and bedridden residents and their caregivers, providmg a comisrent presence and form of accompaniment.
This amounrs to about six to eight hours of unpaid labor each day, in
addition to the incalculable emotional labor and their lives as mothers, grandmothers, partner,, and d.iughcer,. Besides rhe lunch deliver}, the CAM's major projects include a weekly acupuncture clinic,
gardens, a rhrifi: hop, and an acrinrr room for rhe elderl)·, where the)
hose calks .rnd workshops. play dominoes , ,rnd do arc projects. CAM
leader, are partnering w1ch the Residents' Association co develop a
community emergency plan, which "di include convening pare of
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chc school into an emergency ,helter .rnd administering a census
co identify resident,' specific circumstance,, like\\ hecher they rake
medications. li\'c alone, and ha\'e limiccd mobility.
Centro de Apoyo Mutuo, Las Carolinas.
Photo by author.

Local projects ofm,togestJoncannot
replace holding scace msricunons like
H ..MA accountable and demanding
access co the disascer assistance and public services char people have every righc
co. But rhc: policies of Apoyo Muruo in chis particular case dc:monsrratc another path forward-albeit one constrained and shaped by
relation, of power-char is framed around support and affecm ·e relarionalmcs. 0 This "_.,ocialecology of support" rc1ecrs individualizing
framc:works that render people a, comumer~ 111 a recovery marker
who arc:disciplined ch rough relations of property and debt and chm
may point to a more equitable path forward.
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